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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs (G-24). The G-24 was established in
1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating strength of the
developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international financial
institutions.  The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within the IMF
and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD’s Macroeconomic and
Development Policies Branch, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce a
development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research carried out under the project is coordinated by Professor Dani Rodrik,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The research papers are
discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings of  the G-24 Technical Group,
and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers and Deputies in their preparations
for negotiations and discussions in the framework of the IMF’s International Monetary
and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee) and the Joint IMF/IBRD
Development Committee, as well as in other forums. Previously, the research papers for
the G-24 were published by UNCTAD in the collection International Monetary and
Financial Issues for the 1990s.  Between 1992 and 1999 more than 80 papers were
published in 11 volumes of this collection, covering a wide range of monetary and financial
issues of major interest to developing countries. Since the beginning of 2000 the studies
are published jointly by UNCTAD and the Center for International Development at
Harvard University in the G-24 Discussion Paper Series.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and the Governments of
Denmark and the Netherlands, as well as contributions from the countries participating
in the meetings of the  G-24.RECASTING THE INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL AGENDA
José Antonio Ocampo
Executive Secretary, United Nations Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
G-24 Discussion Paper No. 13
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Abstract
This paper argues that the agenda for international financial reform must be
broadened in at least two senses. First of all, it should go beyond the issues of financial
prevention and resolution to those associated with development finance for poor and
small countries, and to the “ownership” of economic and development policies by
countries. Secondly, it should consider, in a systematic fashion, not only the role of
world institutions but also of regional arrangements and the explicit definition of areas
where national autonomy should be maintained. These issues should be tabled in a
representative, balanced negotiation process.
In the area of financial crisis prevention and resolution, a balance must be struck
between the need to improve the institutional framework in which financial markets
operate and the still insufficient attention to the design of appropriate schemes to
guarantee the coherence of macroeconomic policies worldwide, the enhanced provision
of emergency financing during crises, and the creation of adequate debt standstill and
orderly debt workout procedures. In the area of development finance, emphasis should
be given to the need to increase funding to low-income countries. The role of multilateral
development banks in counter-cyclical financing – including support to social safety
nets during crises – must also be emphasized. The enhanced provision of emergency
and development financing should be accompanied by a renewed international agreement
on the limits of conditionality and a recognition of the central role of the “ownership”
of development and macroeconomic policies by developing countries.
Regional and subregional institutions should play an essential role in the supply of
“global public goods” and other services in international finance. The required financial
architecture should in some cases have the nature of a network of institutions that provide
the services required in a complementary fashion (in the areas of emergency financing,
surveillance of macroeconomic policies, prudential regulation and supervision of
domestic financial systems, etc.), and in others (particularly in development finance)
should exhibit the characteristics of a system of competitive organizations. The fact
that any new order would continue to have the characteristics of an incomplete “financial
safety net” implies both that national policies would continue to play a disproportionate
role in crisis prevention and that certain areas should continue to be realms of national
autonomy, particularly capital account regulations and the choice of exchange rate
regimes.ix Recasting the International Financial Agenda
BIS Bank for International Settlements
CCL Contingency Credit Line
ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ESAF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
GDP gross domestic product
FDI foreign direct investment
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IMF International Monetary Fund
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I. Introduction
The recent phase of financial turmoil that started
in Asia, crossed through the Russian Federation and
then reached Latin America, generated a deep sense
that fundamental reforms were required in the inter-
national financial architecture to prevent and improve
the management of financial crises. The crisis led,
indeed, to a recognition that there is an enormous
discrepancy between the sophisticated and dynamic
financial world and the institutions regulating it, and
that “existing institutions are inadequate to deal with
financial globalization” (UN, 1999, sect. 1).
The crisis set in motion positive responses: a
concerted expansionary effort in the midst of the cri-
sis, led by the United States, which was probably the
crucial step that facilitated the fairly rapid though
incomplete normalization of capital markets; the
approval of new credit lines and the expansion of
IMF resources; the recognition that incentives must
be created to induce adequate debt profiles in devel-
oping countries, and that some capital account
regulations may serve this purpose and provide a
breathing space for corrective macroeconomic poli-
cies; the parallel recognition that financial liberali-
zation in developing countries should be carefully
managed and sequenced; a special impetus to inter-
national efforts to establish minimum standards of
prudential regulation and supervision, as well as of
information; the acceptance that no exchange rate
regime is appropriate for all countries under all cir-
cumstances; the partial acceptance by IMF that fiscal
overkill is inappropriate in adjustment programmes;
the improvement of the HIPC Initiative; and the
greater emphasis given to the design of adequate so-
cial safety nets in developing countries.1
Some responses were positive but do not seem
to have been leading in any clear direction (or even
in a wrong one). This is the case of the adoption of
collective action clauses in debt issues as an essen-
tial step to facilitate internationally agreed debt
standstills and orderly workout procedures. In some
cases, the responses were insufficient or were clearly
inadequate: IMF conditionality was overextended;
the need for stable arrangements to guarantee the
coherence of the macroeconomic policies of indus-
trialized countries did not receive sufficient scrutiny;
the Japanese proposal to create an Asian Monetary
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Committee on Economic and Social Affairs (UN, 1999), as well as on Ocampo (1999, 2000a) and on joint work with Stephany
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led to its rapid dismissal (though there has been a
recent revival of this idea); more generally, the role
which regional institutions could play in an appro-
priate international financial arrangement was not
given adequate attention; and no (or only very par-
tial) steps were taken to ensure a fair representation
of developing countries in the discussions on reform
or in a revised international architecture.
The partial recovery of capital markets since
1999 gave way to a sense of complacency that slowed
down the reform effort. Moreover, it could lead ef-
forts in the wrong direction. One such step would be
to give new impetus to discussions on capital account
convertibility. The calmer environment could be
taken, on the other hand, as an opportunity to broaden
the agenda and to set in motion a representative, bal-
anced negotiation process. The ongoing process for
a United Nations Consultation on Financing for
Development in 2001 constitutes an important op-
portunity in this regard. The agenda should be
broadened in at least two senses: first of all, it should
go beyond the issues of financial crisis prevention
and resolution – which may be termed the “narrow”
financial architecture (Ocampo, 2000a) – to include
those associated with development finance and the
“ownership” of economic and, particularly, devel-
opment policies; secondly, it should consider, in a
systematic fashion, not only the role of world insti-
tutions, but also of regional arrangements and the
areas where national autonomy should be maintained.
Such is the focus of this paper. As a background,
section II presents brief reflections on the nature of
the problems that the system faces and the political
economy of the reform effort. The paper then deals
with crisis prevention and management, development
finance, the issue of conditionality versus “owner-
ship” (which concerns both of them), the role of
regional institutions, and national regulations and
autonomy. The last section draws some conclusions.
II. The nature of the problems that the
system faces
International capital flows to developing coun-
tries exhibited four outstanding features in the 1990s.2
First of all, official and private flows displayed op-
posite patterns: whereas the former tended to decline,
private capital flows experienced rapid medium-term
growth. Secondly, different private flows showed
striking differences in terms of stability. Thirdly, pri-
vate flows were concentrated in middle-income
countries, with official flows playing only a very
partial redistributive role at the global level. Finally,
the instability of private financial flows required the
design of major emergency rescue packages, of un-
precedented size, which concentrated funds in a few
large “emerging” economies.
The first two patterns are shown in table 1. Both
FDI and all types of private financial flows have ex-
perienced strong medium-term growth. However,
these flows have shown striking differences in terms
of stability: whereas FDI has been resilient in the
face of crises, private financial flows have ex-
perienced strong volatility and “contagion” effects.
Although access to markets has tended to be restored
faster than in the past, credit conditions – spreads,
maturities and special options to reduce investors’
risks – have deteriorated, and significant instability
in capital flows has been the rule since the eruption
of the Asian crisis.3
In contrast to the growth of private flows, offi-
cial development finance and particularly its largest
component, bilateral aid, have lagged behind. Indeed,
bilateral aid has fallen in real terms and currently
stands at one third of the internationally agreed
target of 7 per cent of the GDP of industrialized
countries (World Bank, 2000: 58). The reduction in
bilateral aid has been strongest in the case of the larg-
est industrialized countries. This trend has been partly
offset, in terms of effective resource transfers, by the
increasing share of grants in official development
assistance. Also, contrary to private flows, official
finance has been stable and some components of it –
particularly balance-of-payments support, but also
multilateral development finance – have displayed
an anti-cyclical behaviour.
The third pattern is shown in table 2. Private
flows have been strongly concentrated in middle-in-
come countries. The share of low-income nations in
private financing has been lower than their share in
the total population of developing countries, a fact
that may be expected, but it is also lower than their
share in developing countries’ GDP. This fact is par-
ticularly evident in bond financing, commercial bank
lending and portfolio flows (excluding India in the
latter). In all these cases, private financing to poor
countries is minimal. The share of low-income coun-
tries in FDI is also smaller than their contribution to
developing countries’ GDP. Moreover, a striking fea-
ture of FDI is its high concentration in China, which
captures, on the contrary, a smaller proportion of fi-
nancial flows. The high concentration of the most
volatile flows in middle-income countries, exclud-
ing China, in turn implies that issues of financial3 Recasting the International Financial Agenda
volatility and contagion are particularly relevant to
them.
Low-income countries have thus been mar-
ginalized from private flows and have continued to
depend on declining official resource flows. They
have, indeed, been strongly dependent on official
development assistance, particularly grants, coming
mostly in the form of bilateral aid. If we again ex-
clude India, this is the only component of the net
resource flows to developing countries that is highly
progressive, in the sense that the share of low-in-
come countries exceeds not only their share in
developing countries’ GDP but also in population.
This is also marginally true of multilateral financ-
ing, excluding IMF.
The volatility of private financial flows, on the
one hand, and its strong concentration in middle-in-
come countries, on the other, have jointly generated
the need for exceptional financing on an unprec-
edented scale, which has been concentrated in a few
“emerging” countries. As a result, IMF (including
ESAF) financing has shown both strong anti-cycli-
cal behaviour in relation to private flows and a
concentration in a few countries. As the figure below
indicates, both patterns are closely associated, as
cyclical borrowing by a few countries is the major
determinant of the overall cyclical pattern. The lat-
ter feature has become even more marked in recent
years. Thus, whereas India and the three largest Latin
American borrowers received less than half of net
real flows from the Fund during the period 1980–
1984, net real flows to only four large borrowers
(Indonesia, Mexico, Republic of Korea, and Russian
Federation) accumulated close to 90 per cent of total
net real flows from the Fund in 1995–1998. As a
result of this feature, the share of IMF financing go-
ing to large borrowers4 has displayed a strong upward
trend over the past two decades. Indeed, in recent
years, IMF financing has underestimated the magni-
tude of emergency financing to large borrowers, as
the bilateral contributions to the rescue packages of
six nations (Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Republic of
Korea, Russian Federation, and Thailand) are not
included in the data.5
Table 1
NET LONG-TERM FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,a 1990–1999
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999b
Total 98.5 124.0 153.7 219.2 220.4 257.2 313.1 343.7 318.3 290.7
Official flows 55.9 62.3 54.0 53.4 45.9 53.9 31.0 39.9 50.6 52.0
Private flows 42.6 61.6 99.7 165.8 174.5 203.3 282.1 303.9 267.7 238.7
From international
capital markets 18.5 26.4 52.2 99.8 85.7 98.3 151.3 133.6 96.8 46.7
Private debt flows 15.7 18.8 38.1 48.8 50.5 62.2 102.1 103.4 81.2 19.1
Commercial bank loans 3.2 5.0 16.4 3.5 8.8 30.4 37.5 51.6 44.6 -11.4
Bonds 1.2 10.9 11.1 36.6 38.2 30.8 62.4 48.9 39.7 25.0
Others 11.3 2.8 10.7 8.7 3.5 1.0 2.2 3.0 -3.1 5.5
Portfolio equity flows 2.8 7.6 14.1 51.0 35.2 36.1 49.2 30.2 15.6 27.6
Foreign direct investment 24.1 35.3 47.5 66.0 88.8 105.0 130.8 170.3 170.9 192.0
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2000, 4 April 2000 (http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/gdf2000/vol1.htm).
a Net long-term resource flows are defined as net liability transactions of original maturity greater than one year. Although
the Republic of Korea is a high-income country, it is included in the developing country aggregate since it is a borrower
from the World Bank.
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Table 2
NET FLOW OF RESOURCES, 1992–1998
(Annual averages, billion dollars and percentages)
Foreign direct Portfolio Bilateral Multilateral
investment equity flows Grants financing financinga
APAPAPAPAP
Developing countries 109.4 100.0 33.0 100.0 28.0 100.0 2.3 100.0 15.3 100.0
Excluding China 75.4 68.9 29.4 89.2 27.7 99.0 0.3 13.1 13.1 86.0
Low-income countries 7.4 6.8 3.0 9.0 16.2 58.0 0.8 36.7 5.8 37.8
India 1.8 1.6 2.2 6.6 0.5 2.0 -0.3 -11.2 1.0 6.4
Other countries 5.6 5.1 0.8 2.4 15.7 56.1 1.1 48.0 4.8 31.5
Chinab 34.0 31.1 3.6 10.8 0.3 1.0 2.0 86.9 2.1 14.0
Middle-income countries 68.0 62.1 26.4 80.2 11.4 40.9 -0.5 -23.6 7.4 48.2
Argentina 5.2 4.7 1.5 4.5 0.0 0.1 -0.2 -10.1 1.0 6.5
Brazil 9.8 8.9 3.6 10.9 0.1 0.2 -1.1 -49.6 0.7 4.9
Indonesia 3.0 2.7 2.1 6.4 0.2 0.8 1.2 52.8 0.3 2.0
Mexico 8.8 8.0 4.5 13.6 0.0 0.1 -0.7 -28.8 0.3 2.0
Republic of Koreac 2.0 1.9 3.5 10.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 3.1 1.1 7.4
Russian Federation 1.9 1.8 1.0 3.0 1.0 3.5 0.5 21.6 0.9 5.9
Other countries 37.3 34.1 10.3 31.3 10.1 36.2 -0.3 -12.6 3.0 19.6
Commercial
Bonds bank loans Other loans Total Memo
Popu-
A P A P A P A P GDP lation
Developing countries 38.2 100.0 27.5 100.0 3.7 100.0 257.4 100.0 100.0 100.0
Excluding China 36.6 95.7 26.7 97.0 0.3 8.7 209.5 81.4 89.3 74.8
Low-income countries 1.0 2.7 0.7 2.6 1.1 29.5 36.0 14.0 11.3 40.7
India 0.9 2.4 0.5 1.6 0.2 5.9 6.8 2.6 5.3 19.4
Other countries 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.9 23.5 29.2 11.4 6.0 21.3
Chinab 1.6 4.3 0.8 3.0 3.4 91.3 47.9 18.6 10.7 25.2
Middle-income countries 35.6 93.0 26.0 94.4 -0.8 -20.8 173.5 67.4 78.0 34.1
Argentina 5.9 15.4 1.2 4.5 0.0 -1.3 14.5 5.6 4.7 0.7
Brazil 3.1 8.0 9.6 34.7 -0.5 -13.3 25.2 9.8 10.3 3.3
Indonesia 1.4 3.6 0.3 1.2 0.1 2.9 8.6 3.4 3.1 4.0
Mexico 4.8 12.6 1.6 5.8 -0.4 -10.9 19.0 7.4 6.1 1.9
Republic of Koreac 6.8 17.7 0.7 2.5 -0.4 -10.4 13.8 5.3 6.8 0.9
Russian Federation 2.3 6.0 1.1 4.0 1.1 29.0 9.8 3.8 6.6 3.1
Other countries 11.4 29.7 11.5 41.7 -0.6 -16.8 82.7 32.1 40.4 20.1
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2000, CD-ROM (advance release), Washington, DC (2000); and World Economic
Indicators 1999, Washington, DC (1999) for GDP and population data.
Note: A = amount; P = percentage.
a Excluding IMF.
b The World Bank considered China as a low-income country until 1998. Since 1999 it has been classified as a middle-
income country. In this table it is considered as a specific category.
c The World Bank classifies it as a high-income country, but it is included as a middle-income country in Global
Development Finance 2000.5 Recasting the International Financial Agenda
Strictly speaking, however, “crowding out” by
the largest borrowers does not seem to have taken
place, as overall Fund support has responded elasti-
cally to the needs of these large borrowers, with
financing to other poorer or smaller middle-income
countries remaining stagnant or even increasing mar-
ginally when they also required additional balance-
of-payments resources. This was the case in the 1980s
for much of the developing world and has also been
true of the supply of financing to the smaller East
Asian and Pacific nations in recent years. In any case,
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Figure 1
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have complemented private funds through the busi-
ness cycle. Given the high concentration of private
capital flows in middle-income countries, this has
led to a similar pattern of concentration in the case
of official emergency financing. In the context of a
significant scarcity of official funds for low-income
countries, the high concentration of balance-of-pay-
ments support in a few large “emerging” economies
raises significant concerns as to the global rational-
ity with which global capital, and even official flows,
are distributed. It certainly raises question about
whether the problems of the largest developing coun-
tries generate specific biases in the response of the
international community.
Thus, although the volatility and contagion ex-
hibited by private capital flows – the centre of
attention in recent debates – are certainly problem-
atic, no less important are the problems of the
marginalization of the poorest countries from private
capital flows and the decline in the bilateral aid on
which they largely depend. International financial
reforms must thus be focused also on guaranteeing
solutions to all these problems. Moreover, the debt
overhang of many developing countries, particularly
poor ones, continues to weigh heavily on their de-
velopment possibilities.
III. Financial crisis prevention and
resolution
A. Improving the institutional frameworks
in which financial markets operate
The issues associated with financial crisis pre-
vention and resolution have received extensive
attention in recent discussions.6 The most important
area of agreement relates to the need to improve the
institutional framework in which financial markets
operate: to strengthen prudential regulation, super-
vision and accounting practices of financial systems
worldwide; to adopt minimum international stand-
ards in these areas, codes of conduct of fiscal,
monetary and financial policies, and sound princi-
ples of corporate governance; and to improve the
information provided to financial markets. From the
point of view of industrialized countries, the central
issues are stricter regulation and supervision of highly
leveraged institutions and operations, controls on
offshore centres, and the greater weight that should
be given to the risks associated with operations with
countries engaging in large-scale net borrowing, par-
ticularly of a short-term character, to discourage risky
financing at the source. In this regard, it should be
emphasized that, despite the recognition of the cen-
tral role of the strengthening of regulations of highly
leveraged institutions, moves in this direction have
been rather timid and biased towards indirect rather
than direct regulations.
From the point of view of borrowing econo-
mies, greater weight should be given by domestic
regulators to the accumulation of short-term liabili-
ties in foreign currencies, to risks associated with
the rapid growth of credit, to currency mismatches
of assets and liabilities, and to the valuation of fixed
assets as collateral during episodes of asset inflation.
Most importantly, due account should be taken of
the links between domestic financial risks and
changes in key macroeconomic policy instruments,
notably exchange and interest rates. This indicates
that prudential standards should be stricter in devel-
oping countries, where such links are more important,
and that they should be strengthened during periods
of financial euphoria to take into account the increas-
ing risks being incurred by financial intermediaries.
Due account should also be taken of the important
externalities which large non-financial firms could
generate for the domestic financial sector, which
implies that the external liabilities exposure of these
firms should also be regulated. We shall return to
these issues below.
Nonetheless, a substantial divergence of opin-
ion remains. Firstly, there is no consensus as to which
institutions should be entrusted with enhanced re-
sponsibilities in this field. The BIS should certainly
play the leading role, but this requires a significant
expansion of developing country membership in this
organization. The more ambitious proposal to create
a World Financial Authority on the basis of BIS,
IOSCO and IAIS should also be considered (Eatwell
and Taylor, 2000).
Secondly, the lack of adequate representation
of developing countries in the definition of all sorts
of international standards and codes of conduct is a
basic deficiency of current arrangements7 – which
the launching of the Group of Twenty only partly
solves – and violates the central principle formulated
by Helleiner (2000a): “No harmonization without
representation”. It also works against the necessary
adaptation of rules to developing country conditions
(Ahluwalia, 1999).
Thirdly, although the essential role of regulation
and supervision is to make financial intermediaries7 Recasting the International Financial Agenda
more risk-conscious, there are clear limits to the ap-
propriateness of discouraging private risk-taking.
Stronger prudential regulation in developing countries
increases the costs of domestic financial intermedia-
tion and thus encourages the use of more external
borrowing in the absence of adequate regulation of
the latter. Fourthly, differences exist as to the rela-
tive merits of prudential regulations and supervision
versus alternative instruments in key areas. One par-
ticularly relevant issue in this regard, as will be seen
in section VII, relates to capital account regulations.
Moreover, there are significant differences of opin-
ion as to what may be expected from enhanced
prudential regulation and supervision, given their
inherent limitations. Regulations will tend to lag be-
hind financial innovations, supervisors are likely to
face significant information problems, and macroeco-
nomic events may overwhelm even well-regulated
systems. Finally, traditional prudential regulation and
supervision tend to have pro-cyclical macroeconomic
effects (they may be unable to avoid excessive risk-
taking during the booms but may accelerate the credit
crunch during crises, when bad loans become evi-
dent and the effects of provisioning standards are thus
felt), a fact which may increase rather than decrease
credit risks through the business cycle.
Equally important, there is some doubt as to
what can be expected from better information. In-
deed, although improved information enhances
microeconomic efficiency, it may not improve mac-
roeconomic stability, which is dominated by the
evolution of opinions and expectations rather than
information, in the correct sense of that term (i.e.
factual information). Indeed, the tendency to equate
opinions and expectations with “information” is a
source of confusion in the recent literature. Well-
informed agents (rating agencies and institutional
investors, for example) are equally subject to the
whims of opinion and expectations, a fact that ac-
counts for their inability to stabilize markets and,
indeed, under certain conditions, for the additional
instability which they may generate.8 To use modern
terminology, more than “information cascades”, what
characterizes macroeconomic financial instability are
“opinion and expectation cascades”, i.e. the alternate
“contagion” of both optimism and pessimism through
the business cycle. The best information system will
be unable to correct this “market failure”, as the
whims of expectations involve “information” about
the future which will never be available.9 Develop-
ing countries have also strongly argued for “a
symmetrical application of transparency criteria be-
tween public institutions and the private sector”
(Group of Twenty-Four, 1999a), and thus against the
tendency to emphasize the former over the latter in
current proposals. Heated debates still surround the
advantages versus the disadvantages of the disclo-
sure of IMF surveillance reports, which reflect the
relative virtues of greater information and transpar-
ency versus “the importance of maintaining the
Fund’s role as confidential and trusted advisor”.10
B. The need for coherent macroeconomic
policies worldwide
The consensus on the need to strengthen the
institutional framework in which financial markets
operate has not been matched by a similar emphasis
on the role played by the coherence of macroeconomic
policies worldwide, i.e. on appropriate mechanisms
to internalize the externalities generated by national
macroeconomic policies.11 A particularly crucial area,
which the Group of Twenty-Four and other analysts
have emphasized, are the high costs that fluctuations
among major currencies have for developing coun-
tries.12
The need for coherent macroeconomic policies
is crucial in relation to both booms and crises, but
the need to strengthen the extremely weak existing
arrangements is particularly crucial during booms,
when IMF surveillance is perceived by national
authorities as an academic exercise, consultative
mechanisms seem less necessary and “market disci-
pline” has perverse effects, as it does not constrain
excessive private risk-taking or the adoption of na-
tional pro-cyclical policies. Indeed, the focus of
current institutions, both national and international,
on crises rather than booms is a serious deficiency
of existing arrangements, as they underplay the pre-
ventive role that they should perform. Obviously,
concerted expansionary action during crises is also
essential and, as was pointed out in the introduction
to this paper, moves in that direction since the Rus-
sian crisis were probably the single most important
reason for the relative, although incomplete, normali-
zation of capital markets in 1999.
The lack of adequate representation of de-
veloping countries in existing organs is another
deficiency of current arrangements, as the composi-
tion of the IMF International Monetary and Financial
Committee reflects. Given the more adequate balance
in the representation of developing and developed
countries, the United Nations could play an enhanced
role in the normative area, through either an improved
Economic and Social Council or an Economic Secu-
rity Council.8 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 13
C. Emergency financing
The enhanced provision of emergency financ-
ing during crises is the third pillar of the system to
prevent and manage financial crises. This principle
may be called the principle of the “emergency finan-
cier”, to differentiate it from the role that central
banks play at the national level as “lenders of last
resort”, which is not exactly matched by IMF. More
specifically, the Fund provides exceptional financ-
ing but certainly not liquidity, a fact that is reflected
in the lack of automaticity in the availability of fi-
nancing during crises.13 The access to emergency
financing raises, in any case, “moral hazard” issues
that give rise, on the side of borrowers, to the need
to define access rules and, on the side of private lend-
ers, to the need for orderly debt workouts that
guarantee that they assume a fair share of the costs
of adjustment.
The main lessons from recent crises are that:
(i) as a preventive measure, wider use should be
made of private contingency credit lines that
are agreed during periods of adequate access to
capital market, following the (partly success-
ful) pioneering experiences of some “emerging”
economies;
(ii) large-scale official emergency funding may be
required, though not all of it needs to be dis-
bursed if support programmes rapidly restore
market confidence;
(iii) funds should be made available before, rather
than after, international reserves reach critically
low levels; and
(iv) due to strong contagion effects, contingency
financing may be required even by countries
that do not display fundamental disequilibria.
At least the last two lessons imply significant differ-
ences with respect to the traditional IMF approach,
which is based on the principle of correcting funda-
mental balance-of-payments disequilibria once they
have become evident. Positive measures have been
adopted in this area, including a significant expan-
sion of IMF resources through a quota increase and
the New Arrangements to Borrow, which entered
into effect in late 1998; the launching of SRF in De-
cember 1997 to finance exceptional borrowing
requirements during crises; and the creation of CCL
in April 1999 to provide financing to countries fac-
ing contagion and its redesign in September 2000.
The major controversies relate to inadequate
funding, conditions for access and credit terms. With
respect to the first point, bilateral financing and con-
tributions to IMF will continue to be scarce during
crises. This is a crucial issue, as the stabilizing ef-
fects of rescue packages will be absent if the market
deems that the intervening authorities (IMF plus ad-
ditional bilateral support) are unable or unwilling to
supply funds in the quantities required. As bilateral
financing and contributions to IMF will continue to
be scarce and unreliable during crises, the best solu-
tion, according to several recent proposals, is to allow
additional issues of SDRs during episodes of global
financial stress; these funds could be destroyed once
financial conditions normalize.14 This procedure
would create an anti-cyclical element in global li-
quidity management and would give SDRs an
enhanced role in world finance, a principle that de-
veloping countries have advocated in the past and
should continue to endorse in the future. Second-best
alternatives are to make more active use of Central
Bank swap arrangements under IMF or BIS leader-
ship, and to allow IMF to raise the resources needed
in the market.
The broad issues raised by conditionality will be
discussed in section V below. However, the adequate
mix of conditionality and other credit conditions
deserves some attention here. In this regard, the idea
that conditionality cum the provision of limited fund-
ing should be mixed with harder terms for exceptional
financing – both shorter maturities and higher spreads
– is controversial. This has been the pattern estab-
lished in new IMF facilities (both SRF and CCL)
and was introduced as a general principle of IMF
financing in September 2000, which will only be
applied, however, after a transitional period. It has
eliminated the “credit union” character of IMF but
still does not reflect “market conditions”. It should
be recalled, in this regard, that the classical Bagehot
criteria for lending of last resort relies on short-term
financing at penalty interest rates, but on the basis
that financing is unconditional and unlimited (or, to
be precise, limited by good collaterals only). Thus,
contrary to current IMF practice, Bahegot criteria
consider more onerous credit terms (with unlimited
funding) as a substitute rather than a complement
for conditionality (cum limited funding).
Indeed, following ideas closer to these classi-
cal criteria, some of the more radical proposals in
this area involve reducing conditionality significantly
and moving towards short-term credit lines, at pen-
alty interest rates.15 These alternatives are equally
controversial. First of all, they also violate one of9 Recasting the International Financial Agenda
Bahegot’s criteria: unlimited funding; indeed, these
proposals would restrict financing severely when
compared to recent IMF credit lines. Secondly, in
some of these proposals, conditionality is maintained,
and even includes conditions that have been absent
in traditional IMF financing.16 Moreover, a basic as-
sumptions of these proposals is that recent crises have
been severe but short (see Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, 1999, chap. III) – a fact that, as argued in
section II, has not been confirmed by events since
the Asian crisis.17 More importantly, the characteris-
tics of recent crises – including their duration – is
certainly not independent of the rapid response of
the international community in the form of larger and
faster rescue packages than in the past (along the “les-
sons” previously inferred). During the Asian crisis,
it was also associated, as indicated, with the rapid,
concerted macroeconomic response of industrialized
countries.
The recent CCL designed to deal with conta-
gion has introduced similar but also some additional
problems. Again, following traditional “lending of
last resort” criteria, critics have argued that such a
credit line should have more onerous credit terms,
but should also be automatic, based on whether
countries fulfil certain ex ante criteria, and thus be
detached from traditional conditionality. Even after
its redesign, the CCL does not fully meet these crite-
ria: although the “activation” process made access
more automatic, and monitoring arrangements were
made less intensive, the “post-activation” review still
kept the character of traditional IMF financing sub-
ject to conditionality (though now subject to lower
initial charges). A more important difficulty is that
ex ante signalling transforms, in effect, IMF into a
credit-rating agency, a fact that could generate severe
destabilizing effects on countries when downgraded.
It also transforms the nature of Article IV consulta-
tions, eroding its character of a dialogue with a
“trusted advisor”.
This discussion highlights how complex it is
for an “emergency financier” (rather than a true
“lender of last resort”) to find the appropriate mix of
conditionality, limited funding and more onerous
credit terms. The adequate solution would require:
(i) large up-front financing; (ii) no prequalifications,
but a fast review process during periods of crisis and,
in particular, strong contagion; and (iii) reduced con-
ditionality in general, but particularly for those credit
lines subject to harsher terms.18
D. Debt standstills and orderly workout
procedures
Debt standstills and orderly workouts pro-
cedures are an essential mechanism to avoid the
coordination problems implicit in chaotic capital
flight, to guarantee an appropriate sharing of adjust-
ments by private lenders, and thus avoid “moral
hazard” issues associated with emergency financing.
Broad consensus on the need to create arrangements
of this sort exists,19 but little action has followed.
This reflects both private sector opposition to non-
voluntary arrangements in industrialized countries
and also the practical difficulties involved in de-
signing a mechanism of this nature.20 As recently
summarized by the IMF International Monetary and
Financial Committee, these difficulties are associ-
ated with the need to strike a balance between broad
principles, required to guide market expectations, and
the operational flexibility, which calls for elements
of a “case-by-case” approach (IMF, 2000c; Köhler,
2000). It is clear, however, that there is no substitute
to the declaration of a debt standstill by the borrowing
country, followed by voluntary negotiations with lend-
ers, subject to some internationally agreed principles.
Due to the effects that the use of this mecha-
nism could have on their credit standing, borrowing
countries are unlikely to abuse it. Nonetheless, to
avoid “moral hazard” issues on the side of borrow-
ers, it must be subject to international control by
allowing countries to call a standstill unilaterally, but
then requiring that they submit it for approval by an
independent international panel or an agreed inter-
national authority whose authorization would give it
legitimacy (UNCTAD, 1998, Part I, chap. IV; UN,
1999). An alternative could be to draft ex ante rules
under which debt service could be automatically sus-
pended or reduced if certain macroeconomic shocks
were experienced; such rules have sometimes been
incorporated into debt renegotiation agreements.
On the other hand, debt issues and negotiations
must be subject to five basic rules. Firstly, to avoid
both free riding and discrimination against countries
or a group of countries adopting them, they require
the universal adoption by borrowing countries of
“collective action clauses”, as indeed British rules
already require. The G-7 countries must actually lead
the process, as they suggested in October 1998
(Group of Seven, 1998), for otherwise these clauses
would become an additional source of discrimina-
tion against “emerging markets”. Secondly, “bailing
in” should be encouraged by giving seniority to lend-10 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 13
ing that is extended to countries during the period in
which the standstill is in effect and during a later
phase of “normalization” of capital flows. Thirdly,
IMF “lending into arrears” should continue to be
considered a normal practice so long as countries
seek to work cooperatively with private creditors.
Fourthly, the phase of voluntary debt renegotiations
under this framework must have a short, strictly de-
fined, time horizon, beyond which the country in
arrears could request the independent panel or inter-
national authority to intervene in the negotiations or
even to determine the terms of rescheduling. Indeed,
the basic deficiency of voluntary case-by-case solu-
tions is that the negotiation periods can become
extremely long, generating large costs to developing
countries, as the experience of Latin America in the
1980s indicates. Finally, to avoid repeated renego-
tiations – another troublesome feature of voluntary
arrangements in recent decades – aside from the
portion that is written off (or refinanced in highly
concessional terms), the service of another portion
should be subject to the fulfilment of certain contin-
gent macroeconomic conditions that determine debt
service capacity (e.g. terms of trade, normalization
of lending, domestic economic activity, etc.).
It must be emphasized, finally, that private sec-
tor involvement in crisis resolution should be seen
as a complement, rather than as a substitute or pre-
requisite, for emergency financing (even if only
above a certain threshold level). This implies that
the international agency with authority in this area
could be given the role of advising countries on the
desirability of the standstill but not the capacity to
force it on debtor countries. An alternative system
would significantly increase market instability and/
or “solve” moral hazard issues by increasing spreads
or severely rationing financing to developing coun-
tries. The recent experience indicates, indeed, that
the large rescue packages of the 1990s were served
normally. This indicates that the problems faced by
the emerging economies that led to large-scale
emergency financing had a significant element of
illiquidity rather than insolvency, a fact that argues
for more rather than less emergency financing. The
conditions that such financing carried are, obviously,
more debatable. We shall return to this issue below.
The definition of international rules on capital
account regulations and exchange rate regimes has
been left out of this discussion. The reason is that,
under the current, incomplete, international arrange-
ments, national autonomy should continue to prevail
in these areas. They are therefore considered in sec-
tion VII of this paper.
IV. Development finance
As the discussion presented in section II indi-
cates, although IMF financing is certainly important
to low-income countries, the major issues for them
are associated with the need to guarantee adequate
development finance, through ODA and multilateral
lending, and to generate mechanisms that will allow
them to participate more actively in private capital
markets. Given the relative magnitude of financing
to low-income countries (see table 2), the reversal
of ODA flows – particularly those originating in the
largest industrialized economies – is certainly the
most important issue. Thus, it is important that ef-
forts to accelerate the HIPC Initiative should not
crowd out new ODA financing. Actually, beyond a
more ambitious HIPC Initiative, the world requires
an even more ambitious and permanent “ODA Ini-
tiative” aimed at effectively meeting internationally
agreed targets. An essential characteristic of this proc-
ess, as is emphasized in the following sections, should
be an effective “ownership” of policies by develop-
ing countries, a fact that requires less direction from
abroad and more emphasis on national institution
building. The latter requires, in turn, respect for the
central role that parliaments and governments in aid-
receiving nations should have in the global allocation
of aid through their budgetary processes, and for the
central role that governments in those countries
should have in directing traditional areas of public
policy (for example, social policy and infrastructure),
even when civil society is given a central role in ex-
ecution.
Equally important, however, is the acceleration
of the growth of multilateral development finance.
Such lending will continue to play a central role in
at least four “function” areas:
(i) channelling funds to low-income countries;
(ii) correcting market failures associated with the
overpricing of risks, which may lead to inad-
equate access to long-term financing by middle
income countries with insufficiently high credit
rating;
(iii) acting as a counter-cyclical balance to fluctua-
tions in private capital market financing; and
(iv) facilitating the transition to private markets by
supporting some innovations in long-term fi-
nancing to developing countries and signalling
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To these we should add the traditional “value added”
of multilateral financing: lending-associated techni-
cal assistance.21
The first of these functions underscores the cen-
tral role that financing from IBRD-IDA and the
regional and subregional development banks will
continue to play in the immediate future. It has re-
ceived widespread support in recent debates. The
second and third functions emphasize the role that
official development financing will continue to play
even for middle-income countries. Some authors re-
ject, nonetheless, the validity of these arguments.22
The high interest rates that have characterized pri-
vate lending to developing countries in the 1990s,
and the much shorter maturities of private versus
official financing to middle-income countries, may
indicate that, on average, risk may have been over-
estimated (see table 3).23
It must be stressed, however, that the anti-cy-
clical provision of funds should not be confused with
the provision of emergency balance-of-payments fi-
nancing, which is essentially a task of IMF. However,
to the extent that anti-cyclical fiscal policies are a
necessary element in counter-cyclical macroeco-
nomic management in general, there may be an
argument for development financing during crises
as a counterpart to pure balance-of-payments financ-
ing.24 An alternative would be to allow IMF financing
– or the latitude it offers for domestic credit creation
– for fiscal purposes, but this step would be subopti-
Table 3
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AVERAGE TERMS OF NEW COMMITMENTS
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Average maturity (years)
Official
All developing countries 22.2 20.9 21.1 21.4 22.1 19.2 21.2 20.1 18.5
Income groups
Low income 27.0 25.9 26.8 25.4 26.2 24.4 26.8 26.2 26.6
Middle income 18.8 17.8 17.0 18.1 18.4 15.8 17.2 17.2 14.2
Private
All developing countries 13.9 10.2 10.0 9.4 8.9 7.4 8.3 10.0 8.8
Income groups
Low income 13.7 11.5 12.3 11.3 11.2 8.0 7.5 7.0 7.0
Middle income 13.9 9.9 9.0 8.4 8.1 7.2 8.6 10.8 9.0
Average interest (per cent)
Official
All developing countries 5.5 5.5 5.3 4.8 4.9 5.8 4.8 5.4 5.2
Income groups
Low income 4.0 4.5 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.5 3.9 4.2 3.7
Middle income 6.6 6.1 6.4 5.6 5.8 6.7 5.6 6.0 6.0
Private
All developing countries 8.5 7.8 6.8 6.3 6.3 6.4 7.3 7.3 7.9
Income groups
Low income 7.9 7.5 6.7 6.0 5.7 6.4 6.6 6.4 6.9
Middle income 8.8 7.8 6.9 6.4 6.5 6.4 7.5 7.5 8.0
Source: World Bank (2000).12 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 13
mal. In any case, the large-scale requirements for
counter-cyclical financing to middle-income coun-
tries during crises may crowd out financing to poor
countries – a point which has been made by the Presi-
dent of the World Bank (Wolfensohn, 1998). Thus,
if multilateral development financing is not signifi-
cantly expanded, its role as a counter-cyclical device
will necessarily be very limited, and it would cer-
tainly be of secondary importance relative to its first
two roles, particularly the provision of long-term
development financing to poor countries. This is
underscored by the data from table 2, which indicate
that multilateral financing in 1992–1998 represented
only 15 per cent of that provided by the private
sector, excluding FDI, and only 8 per cent in the case
of middle-income countries. Thus, a useful counter-
cyclical function would certainly require a significant
increase in resources available to multilateral devel-
opment banks or a more active use of cofinancing and
credit guarantees by these institutions (see below).
The role of development banks in supporting
social safety nets, which has received correct em-
phasis in recent discussions, should be seen as part
of the counter-cyclical role that multilateral institu-
tions should play. Strong social safety nets are,
indeed, essential to manage the social repercussions
of financial vulnerability in the developing world.
The concept itself is subject to some confusion, as it
has been used to refer both to the design of long-
term social policies and to specific mechanisms to
protect vulnerable groups during crises. The term
should probably be used to refer specifically to the
latter, although, as will be discussed below, these
arrangements should be part of stable mechanisms
of social protection. Multilateral banks have been
involved in the former for a long time and have also
accumulated some experience with the latter.
Recent analyses have come to some basic con-
clusions about these programmes. Firstly, safety nets
must be part of permanent social protection schemes,
as only a permanent scheme can guarantee that the
programme coverage will respond without lags to
the demand for protection of vulnerable sectors dur-
ing crises (Cornia, 1999). Secondly, given the het-
erogeneity of labour markets in developing countries,
a combination of several programmes, with differ-
ent target groups, is necessary.25 Thirdly, these pro-
grammes must be adequately financed and should
not crowd out resources from long-term investment
in human capital. This, it must be said, leads to a
fourth conclusion: that the effective functioning of
social safety nets requires that public-sector expendi-
ture include anti-cyclical components. This would
be impossible, without generating inefficiencies in
the rest of public-sector expenditure, if fiscal policy
as a whole is not counter-cyclical. In the absence of
this anti-cyclical fiscal pattern, external financing
from development banks to safety nets during crises
will be unnecessary, as overall net fiscal financing
requirements will actually decrease, despite the in-
creased spending associated with such safety nets.
The fourth function is of fairly recent origin but
has been rapidly gaining in importance in the 1990s
and should become one of the primary focuses of
multilateral financing in the future. This function has
been associated in the recent past with direct financ-
ing or cofinancing with the private sector (by banks
or associated financial corporations) or with the
design of guarantee schemes to support private in-
frastructure projects in developing countries. It has
also been recently used to support developing coun-
tries’ efforts to return to markets after crises, and
could be used to support initial bond issues by de-
veloping (particularly poor) countries seeking to
position themselves in private capital markets. It must
be emphasized, however, that the full development
of these guarantee schemes would require a radical
change in the management of guarantees by devel-
opment banks as, under current practices, guarantees
are treated as equivalent to lending – a fact which
severely restricts the banks’ ability to extend them.
Such an expansion of the role of development banks
in guaranteeing private financing has been criticized
on the grounds that it could involve excessive risk-
taking by these institutions. Nonetheless, in a world
dominated by private financing, it may be absolutely
essential to prevent low-income countries from be-
ing left out of major developments in capital markets
and to facilitate a more active anti-cyclical role for
development banks. It should thus receive priority
attention in current discussions.13 Recasting the International Financial Agenda
V. Conditionality versus “ownership”
The most controversial issue behind interna-
tional emergency and development financing is
certainly conditionality. In the case of IMF, this
issue has long been a central area of contention. How-
ever, in recent years, and even decades, the issue has
become increasingly troublesome for three different
reasons. Firstly, the scope of conditionality has been
gradually expanded to include not only the realms of
other international organizations (quite often, for
example, that of the WTO and the development
banks) but also of domestic economic and social
development strategies and institutions which, as the
United Nations Task Force has indicated, “by their
very nature should be decided by legitimate national
authorities, based on broad social consensus” (UN,
1999, sect. 5). The broadening of conditionality to
social policy, governance issues and private sector
involvement in crisis resolution has been criticized
by developing countries in the Group of Twenty-Four
(1999b). The need to restrict conditionality to macro-
economic policy and financial sector issues is shared
by a broad group of analysts with quite different per-
suasions as to the future role of IMF.26 A similar view
was expressed in the external evaluation of surveil-
lance activities of the Fund (Crow et al., 1999). This
led to the recent agreement that IMF conditionality
should be streamlined, though its agreed focus is still
very broad.27
Secondly, whereas the legitimacy of condition-
ality is indisputable when domestic policies are the
source of macroeconomic disequilibria that lead to
financial difficulties, as well as being necessary to
avert “moral hazard” issues, it is unclear how this
principle applies when such difficulties are gener-
ated by international crises and, particularly, by
contagion effects. Thirdly, as has already been
pointed out, it is even less clear why conditionality
should be mixed with adverse credit terms. Finally,
many observers have criticized overkill in some IMF
programmes, a fact that has led the Fund to allow
some room for anti-cyclical fiscal policies in its ad-
justment programmes (Fischer, 1998).
Even if the legitimacy of the principle of con-
ditionality – or, as it is sometimes stated, “support in
exchange for reforms” – is accepted, there are thus
reasons to review the characteristics of such condi-
tionality. Indeed, the perception that conditionality
has been carried beyond what may actually be nec-
essary in order for the Fund to perform its functions
properly may be helping to undermine its legitimacy.
Thus, a strong argument can be made that the way to
restore full confidence in the principle of condition-
ality is by reaching a renewed international agreement
on how it should be used.
Several principles can be advanced in this re-
gard. Firstly, as noted, IMF conditionality should be
restricted to the macroeconomic policies that were
its purview in the past. Reforms of domestic finan-
cial regulation and supervision may also be required,
but in this case parallel agreements should be made
with the corresponding international authorities
(a still unresolved issue, as we have seen). Secondly,
low-conditionality facilities should be available in
adequate quantities when the source of the imbal-
ance is an international shock or a country faces
contagion. Nonetheless, beyond and above the pre-
established level of the low conditionality facilities,
access to Fund resources could be subject to macro-
economic conditionality on traditional terms. Thirdly,
as we have also noted, more stringent credit terms
should not be used as a complement to conditional-
ity. Fourthly, automatic rules should be agreed upon
when signing an agreement with the Fund under
which the restrictiveness of the adjustment pro-
gramme would be eased should evidence of overkill
become clear. Finally, regular official evaluation of
IMF programmes by an autonomous division of the
Fund (a decision already adopted in 2000) and by
outside analysts should be the basis for a regular re-
vision of the nature of conditionality.
It must be emphasized that similar issues have
been raised in relation to development finance. With
respect to this issue, a World Bank report that analy-
ses the success of structural lending, according to its
own evaluation, comes to the conclusion that condi-
tionality does not influence the success or failure of
such programmes at all.28 However, according to the
same report, aid effectiveness is not independent of
countries’ economic policies. In particular, the ef-
fects of aid on growth are higher for economies that
adopt “good” policies, which, according to their defi-
nition, include stable macroeconomic environments,
open trade regimes, adequate protection of property
rights and efficient public bureaucracies that can
deliver good-quality social services. In the context
of good policies, there is an additional positive ef-
fect of aid that is manifested through the “crowding
in” of private financing. Neither of these effects are
present, however, in countries following “wrong”
policies. In terms that are now familiar in the aid
literature, the ownership of adequate economic poli-
cies – i.e. the commitment of national authorities to
them – is what really matters. Conditionality has no14 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 13
additional contribution to make in such cases, and it
is obviously ineffective in the case of countries that
do not follow good policies.
Curiously enough, on the basis of this study the
World Bank draws the conclusion that conditional-
ity is good after all. Hence, it claims that “Conditional
lending is worthwhile where reforms have serious
domestic support” (World Bank, 1998a: 48) and,
in particular, that it “still has a role … to allow gov-
ernments to commit to reform and to signal the
seriousness of reform … but to be effective in this it
must focus on a small number of truly important
measures” (World Bank, 1998a: 19). This statement
is certainly paradoxical if the conclusions of the re-
port are taken at face value. Rather, this study raises
serious doubts about the rationality of conditional-
ity itself, a fact that is, indeed, implicit in the idea
that policies are only effective when they are rooted
in broad national consensus, the essential idea that
has been captured in the concept of “ownership”.29
Indeed, the President of the World Bank has made
the strongest statement in this regard: “We must never
stop reminding ourselves that it is up to the governments
and its people to decide what their priorities should
be. We must never stop reminding ourselves that we
cannot and should not impose development by fiat
from above – or from abroad” (Wolfensohn, 1998).
Rodrik has come to complementary conclu-
sions, which extend to short-term macroeconomic
policies (Rodrik, 1999b). Aside from arguing that
international arrangements should allow for diver-
sity in national development strategies (different
“brands of capitalism”), this author makes a strong
argument that adequate institutions of conflict man-
agement, which can only be guaranteed by national
democratic processes, are crucial for macroeconomic
stability and that this, in turn, is vital for economic
growth. To borrow the term, the “ownership” of ad-
justment programmes is also essential to guarantee
their political sustainability.
The issue of conditionality versus ownership
is, indeed, essential to the broader objectives of de-
mocracy at the world level. There is clearly no sense
in promoting democracy if the representative and
participatory processes at the national level are given
no role in determining economic and social devel-
opment strategies, as well as the particular policy
mix by which macroeconomic stability is obtained.
Both of them may not only be relatively ineffective
but will also lack political sustainability if interna-
tional institutions or the aid agencies of the industri-
alized countries play this role.
VI. The role of regional institutions
There are three basic arguments in support of a
strong role for regional institutions in the new finan-
cial order. The first one is that globalization also
entails open regionalism. The growth of intraregional
trade and direct investment flows are, indeed, strik-
ing features of the ongoing globalization process.
This factor increases macroeconomic linkages and
thus the demands for certain services provided by
the international financial system which we have
analysed in previous sections: macroeconomic sur-
veillance and internalization of the externalities that
national macroeconomic policies have on neighbour-
ing countries, and mutual surveillance of each other’s
mechanisms for the prudential regulation and super-
vision of the financial system.
Secondly, some of these services may be subject
to diseconomies of scale, and it is unclear whether
others have strong scale economies to justify single
international institutions in specific areas (i.e. natu-
ral monopolies). Traditional issues of subsidiarity are
thus raised. For example, macroeconomic consulta-
tion and surveillance at the world level may be nec-
essary to guarantee policy coherence among major
industrialized countries but would certainly be in-
sufficient to manage the externalities generated by
macroeconomic policies on neighbours in the devel-
oping world (or even within Europe). Due to differ-
ences in legal traditions and the sheer scale of the
diseconomies involved, surveillance of national sys-
tems for the prudential regulation and supervision
of financial sectors, and even the definition of spe-
cific minimum standards in this area, may be dealt
with more appropriately with the support of regional
institutions. Development finance can operate effec-
tively at different scales and can perform certain
functions at regional and subregional levels that could
not be performed at the international level. Also,
although regional and international contagion implies
that management of the largest balance-of-payments
crises should be assigned to a single world institu-
tion, it is unclear how far we should push this asser-
tion. Strong regional institutions can serve as regional
buffers, as indicated by post-war western European
experience. Regional reserve funds or swap arrange-
ments can also play a useful role in the developing
world and, if expanded, could even provide full sup-
port to the small- and medium-sized countries within
some regions. Also, as the rising concentration of
balance-of-payments support in some countries in-
dicates (see section II), there may be biases in the
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to the size of the country, a fact which would argue
for a division of labour in the provision of services
in this area between global and regional organiza-
tions.
Thirdly, for smaller countries, access to a
broader menu of alternatives to manage a crisis or to
finance development is relatively more important
than the “global public goods” that the larger inter-
national organizations provide (e.g. global macroeco-
nomic stability) and upon which they will assume
they have little or no influence (i.e. they have the
attitude of “free riders”). Due to their small size, their
negotiation power vis-à-vis large organizations may
be very limited, and their most important defence is
therefore competition in the provision of financial
services from such institutions.
The current discussion has underscored the fact
that some services provided by international finan-
cial institutions, including various “global public
goods”, are being undersupplied. However, according
to previous remarks, it would be wrong to conclude
from this statement that an increasing supply should
come from a few of the world organizations. Rather,
the organizational structure should have, in some
cases, the nature of networks of institutions that pro-
vide the services required on a complementary basis
and, in others, should function as a system of com-
petitive organizations. The provision of the services
required for financial crisis prevention and manage-
ment should be closer to the first model, whereas, in
the realm of development finance, competition
should be the basic rule (and, in fact, should also
include competition with private agents). But purity
in the model’s structure is probably not the best char-
acteristic: it is desirable for parts of networks to
compete against each other (e.g. regional reserve
funds or swap arrangements versus IMF in the pro-
vision of emergency financing) and for competitive
organizations to cooperate sometimes.
This implies that the International Monetary
Fund of the future should not be viewed as a single,
global institution, but rather as the apex of a net-
work of regional and subregional reserve funds and
swap arrangements. To encourage the development
of the latter, incentives could be created to enable
common reserve funds to have automatic access to
IMF financing and/or a share in the allocation of
SDRs proportional to their paid-in resources; in other
words, contributions to common reserve funds could
be treated as equivalent to IMF quotas (UN, 1999,
sect. 9; Ocampo, 2000a). Regional reserve funds or
swap arrangements could provide not only most of
the exceptional financing for smaller countries within
a region but part of the financing for larger countries
as well, and they could also serve to deter, at least
partly, would-be speculators from attacking the cur-
rencies of individual countries.
This model should be extended to the provi-
sion of macroeconomic consultation and surveillance,
as well as to coordination and surveillance of national
systems of prudential regulation and supervision.
Thus, regional and subregional systems, including
peer review mechanisms, should be designed to inter-
nalize the externalities that macroeconomic policies
generate on neighbours. This would complement,
rather than substitute for, regular IMF surveillance.
In the area of prudential regulation and supervision,
more elaborate systems of regional information and
consultation, including the design of specific regional
“minimum standards”, could also play a positive role.
Again, peer reviews should be part of this system.
Aside from other functions considered in section IV,
subregional development banks can play a signifi-
cant role as a mechanism to pool the risks of groups
of developing countries, thus allowing them to make
a more aggressive use of opportunities provided by
private capital markets.
As is well known, western Europe provides the
best example of regional financial cooperation in the
post-war period. The United States, through the
Marshall Plan, catalyzed the initial phases of this
process, which underwent a dynamic deepening from
the design of the European Payments Union to a se-
ries of arrangements for macroeconomic coordination
and cooperation that eventually led to the current
monetary union of most of its members. No similar
schemes have been devised in the rest of the world,
although some proposals have been made, the most
ambitious of which was the Japanese suggestion to
create an Asian Monetary Fund. The most interest-
ing development in recent years has been the swap
arrangement among 13 Asian countries agreed in
May 2000 (Park and Wang, 2000) and initiatives
to strengthen the Latin American (previously An-
dean) Reserve Fund (Agosin, 2000; ECLAC, 2000a,
chap. 2).
Such an institutional framework would have two
positive features. First of all, it might help to bring
more stability to the global economy by providing
essential services that could hardly be provided by a
few international institutions, particularly in the face
of a dynamic process of open regionalism. Secondly,
from the point of view of the equilibrium of global
relations, it would be more balanced than a system16 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 13
based on a few world organizations. This would in-
crease the commitment of less powerful players to
abide by rules that contribute to global and regional
stability.
VII. The realms of national autonomy
Whatever international system is developed, it
is clear that it will continue to be a very imperfect
“financial safety net”. Consequently, a degree of
“self-insurance” by countries will continue to be es-
sential to avoid financial crises, as well as to avoid
“moral hazard” issues intrinsic to any support
scheme. This raises two issues as to the national poli-
cies necessary to guarantee financial stability and the
areas where national autonomy should be maintained.
We shall argue that the international system should
continue to maintain national autonomy in two cru-
cial areas: the management of the capital account and
the choice of the exchange rate regime. The choice
of development strategies is obviously an additional,
essential realm in which national autonomy should
prevail, as the analysis in section V emphasizes.
The experience of developing countries indi-
cates that the management of capital account vola-
tility requires: (i) consistent and flexible macroeco-
nomic management; (ii) strong prudential regulation
and supervision of domestic financial systems; and
(iii) equally strong “liability policies”, aimed at in-
ducing good public and private external and domes-
tic debt profiles.30 Despite the traditional emphasis
on crisis management, the focus of the authorities
instead should be the management of “booms”, since
it is in the periods of euphoria of capital inflows,
trade expansion and terms-of-trade improvements
that crises are incubated. Crisis prevention is thus,
essentially, an issue of the adequate management of
boom periods.
In this regard, regulations on capital inflows
may be essential to avoid unsustainable exchange rate
appreciation during booms. Although some appre-
ciation may be inevitable and even an efficient way
to absorb the increased supply of foreign exchange,
an excessive revaluation may also generate irrevers-
ible “Dutch disease” effects. The regulation of capital
inflows thus plays an essential role in open develop-
ing economies as a mechanism for monetary and
domestic credit restraint and for the avoidance of
unsustainable exchange rate appreciation during
booms. The nature of such regulations will be con-
sidered below. Regulations governing outflows may
also play a role as a way to avoid overshooting inter-
est or exchange rates during crises, which may have
adverse macroeconomic dynamics, including the
greater risk of domestic financial crises; they are also
essential to put in place debt standstill and orderly
debt workout procedures. It is essential, of course,
that capital account regulations be used as a com-
plement, and not a substitute, for fundamental
macroeconomic adjustment.
As pointed out in section III, prudential regula-
tion and supervision must take into account not only
the micro but also the macroeconomic risks typical
of developing countries. In particular, due account
should be taken of the links between domestic finan-
cial risk and changes in key macroeconomic policy
instruments, notably exchange and interest rates. The
risks associated with the rapid growth of domestic
credit, currency mismatches between assets and li-
abilities, the accumulation of short-term liabilities
in foreign currencies by financial intermediaries and
the valuation of fixed assets used as collateral dur-
ing episodes of asset inflation must also be adequately
taken into account. Depending on the operation,
higher capital adequacy requirements, matching li-
quidity requirements, higher provisioning standards
for due loans, precautionary provisioning rules or
caps on the valuation of assets should be established.
Moreover, given these macroeconomic links, pruden-
tial regulations should be strengthened during years
of financial euphoria to take into account the increas-
ing risks being incurred by financial intermediaries.
These links also imply that the application of
contractionary monetary or credit policies during
booms (e.g. higher reserve requirements or ceilings
on the growth of domestic credit) may be highly com-
plementary to stricter prudential regulation and
supervision. Moreover, due to the important exter-
nalities which large non-financial firms could
generate for the domestic financial sector, particu-
larly in the context of exchange rate depreciation,
the external liability exposure of these firms should
also be subject to some regulation. Tax incentives
(e.g. tax on external liabilities or new borrowing, or
limits on the deductibility of external interest costs
or exchange-rate losses) and rules that force non-
financial firms to disclose information on their external
liabilities may thus be relevant complements to ap-
propriate prudential regulation and supervision of
financial intermediaries.
The experience of many developing countries
indicates that crises are associated not only with high
debt ratios but also with inadequate debt profiles.3117 Recasting the International Financial Agenda
The basic reason for this is that under uncertainty
financial markets respond to gross, rather than only
to net, financing requirements, or, in other words,
the rollover of short-run debts is not neutral in finan-
cial terms. This gives an essential role to “liability
policies” aimed at improving debt profiles. Although
improving the external debt profile should be the
central role of such policies, there is a strong com-
plementarity between good external and internal debt
profiles. Hence, excessive short-term domestic bor-
rowing may force a government that is trying to roll
over debt during a crisis to raise interest rates in or-
der to avoid capital flight by investors in government
bonds. Also, excessively high short-term private li-
abilities increase the risks perceived by foreign
lenders during crises – a fact that may induce a
stronger contraction of external lending.
In the case of the public sector, direct controls
by the Ministry of Finance are an appropriate instru-
ment of a liability policy. Exchange rate flexibility
may deter some short-term private flows and thus
partly operate as a “liability policy”, but its effects
are limited in this regard, as it is unlikely to smooth
out medium-term financial cycles, which will be
reflected in a parallel cycle of nominal and real ex-
change rates. Direct controls on inflows may also be
an appropriate instrument to achieve a better private
debt profile. An interesting, indirect price-based
policy tool is reserve requirements on capital inflows,
such as those used by Chile and Colombia in the
1990s. These requirements are a particular type of
Tobin tax, but the equivalent tax rate (3 per cent in
the case of Chile for one-year loans, and 10 per cent
or more in Colombia during the boom) is much higher
than that proposed for an international Tobin tax. A
flat tax has positive effects on the debt profile, as it
induces longer-run borrowing, for which the tax can
be spread over a longer-term period, and is easier to
administer. The effects of this system on the magni-
tude of flows have been the subject of heated
controversy. In any case, since tax avoidance is costly
and short- and long-term borrowing are not perfect
substitutes, the magnitude of flows – or, what is
equivalent interest arbitrage conditions – should also
be affected.32 A basic advantage of this instrument is
that it is targeted at capital inflows and is thus a pre-
ventive policy tool. It also has specific advantages
over prudential regulations that could have similar
effects: it affects both financial and non-financial
agents, and it uses a non-discriminatory price instru-
ment, whereas prudential regulations affect only
financial intermediaries, are usually quantitative in
nature, and supervision is essentially discretionary
in its operation.33
Simple rules are preferable to complex ones,
particularly in underdeveloped regulatory systems.
In this sense, quantitative controls (e.g. flat prohibi-
tions on certain activities or operations) may be
preferable to sophisticated price-based signals, but
simple price rules such as the Chilean-Colombian
system can also play a role. Any regulatory system
must also meet an additional requirement: it must
have adequate institutional backing. A permanent
system of capital account regulations, which can be
strengthened or loosened throughout the business
cycles, is thus preferable to the alternation of free
capital movements during booms and quantitative
controls during crises. Indeed, the latter system may
be totally ineffective if improvised during a crisis,
simply because the administrative machinery to make
it effective is not operative, and it may thus lead to
massive evasion or avoidance of controls. Such a
system is also pro-cyclical and leaves aside the most
important lesson learned about crisis prevention:
avoid overborrowing during booms and thus target
primarily capital inflows rather than outflows.
Obviously, capital account regulations are not
foolproof, and some developing countries may pre-
fer to use policy mixes that avoid their use (e.g. more
active use of fiscal and exchange rate policies, as
well as alternative prudential regulations) or may
prefer a less interventionist environment even at the
cost of greater GDP volatility. Thus, the most com-
pelling argument that can be derived from this
analysis is the need to maintain the autonomy of de-
veloping countries to manage their capital accounts
(UN, 1999; Group of Twenty-Four, 2000b).
There are actually no strong arguments in
favour of moving towards capital account convert-
ibility.34 There is no evidence that capital mobility
leads to an efficient smoothing of expenditures in
developing countries through the business cycle and,
on the contrary, strong evidence that in these coun-
tries the volatility of capital flows is an additional
source of instability. There is also no evidence of an
association between capital account liberalization and
economic growth, and there are some indications that
point in the opposite direction.35 A simple way to
pose the issue is to argue that, even if it were true
that freer capital flows, through their effects on a
more efficient savings-investment allocation proc-
ess, have positive effects on growth, the additional
volatility associated with freer capital markets has
the opposite effect. The absence of an adequate in-
ternational financial safety net is an equally important
argument in this connection. Why should develop-
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do not have access to adequate amount of contin-
gency financing with well-defined conditionality
rules, and no internationally agreed standstills and
debt workout procedures? This is a crucial issue for
countries without significant power in the interna-
tional arena, for whom renouncing any possible
means of crisis management is a costly alternative.
Indeed, there are strong similarities between today’s
international financial world and the era of “free
banking” at the national level: in the absence of cen-
tral banks as lenders of last resort and officially
managed bank rescue schemes, the inconvertibility
of private bank notes was a necessary legal alterna-
tive in the face of bank runs.
Similar arguments could be used to claim that
there are no grounds for limiting the autonomy of
developing countries to choose their exchange rate
regime. There are certainly virtues to the argument
that, in the current globalized world, only convert-
ibility regimes or totally free-floating exchange rate
regimes can generate sufficient credibility in the eyes
of private agents. However, any international rules
in this area would be unfortunate. The advantages
and disadvantages of these extremes, as well as of
interventionist regimes in between the two, have been
subject to extensive historical debate (and, of course,
experience).36 In practice, countries almost invari-
ably choose intermediate regimes – a fact that can
probably be traced back not only to the deficiencies
of the extremes, but also to the many additional de-
mands that authorities face.37 The choice of the
exchange rate regime has, nonetheless, major impli-
cations for economic policy that must be recognized
in macroeconomic surveillance. Particularly, as we
have noticed, domestic prudential regulations must
take into account the specific macroeconomic risks
that financial intermediaries face under each particu-
lar regime.
VIII. Conclusions
This paper has argued that the agenda for inter-
national financial reform must be broadened in at
least two senses. First of all, it should go beyond the
issues of financial prevention and resolution, on
which the recent debate has focused, to those associ-
ated with development finance for poor and small
countries, to overcome the strong concentration of
private and even official financing in a few large
“emerging” economies, and to the “ownership” of
economic and development policies by countries.
Secondly, it should consider, in a systematic fash-
ion, not only the role of world institutions but also
of regional arrangements and the explicit definition
of areas where national autonomy should be main-
tained. These issues should be tabled in a representa-
tive, balanced negotiation process.
In the area of financial crisis prevention and
resolution, a balance must be struck between the cur-
rent emphasis on the need to improve the institutional
framework in which financial markets operate and
the still insufficient attention to, or action on, the
design of appropriate schemes to guarantee the co-
herence of macroeconomic policies worldwide, the
enhanced provision of emergency financing during
crises, and the creation of adequate debt standstill
and orderly debt workout procedures. In the area of
development finance, emphasis should be given to
the need to increase funding to low-income coun-
tries, including the use of multilateral development
finance to support increased participation of low-in-
come and small middle-income countries in private
capital markets. The role of multilateral development
banks in counter-cyclical financing, particularly to
support social safety nets during crises, must also be
emphasized. The enhanced provision of emergency
and development financing should be accompanied
by a renewed international agreement on the limits
of conditionality and a full recognition of the central
role of the “ownership” of development and macro-
economic policies by developing countries.
It has also been argued that regional and
subregional institutions should play an essential role
in increasing the supply of “global public goods” and
other services in the area of international finance.
The required financial architecture should in some
cases have the nature of a network of institutions
that provide the services required in a complemen-
tary fashion (in the areas of emergency financing,
surveillance of macroeconomic policies, prudential
regulation and supervision of domestic financial sys-
tems, etc.), and in others (particularly in development
finance) should exhibit the characteristics of a sys-
tem of competitive organizations. The fact that any
new order would continue to have the characteris-
tics of an incomplete “financial safety net” implies
both that national policies would continue to play a
disproportionate role in crisis prevention and that
certain areas should continue to be realms of national
autonomy, particularly capital account regulations
and the choice of exchange rate regimes. Regional
institutions and national autonomy are especially
important for the smaller players in the international
arena, which will gain significantly from competi-19 Recasting the International Financial Agenda
tion in the services provided to them and from the
maintenance of freedom of action in a context of
imperfect supply of global public goods.
Notes
1 See on some of these issues the regular reports of the IMF
Managing Director to the Interim Committee, now the In-
ternational Monetary and Financial Committee (IMF,
1999, 2000a and b ).
2 For a full evaluation of trends, see UNCTAD (1999, chaps.
III and V), and World Bank (1999, 2000).
3 This was recognized by IMF (2000c) in its September 2000
Communiqué: “… flows remain below pre-crisis levels,
at higher spreads, and continue to show significant vola-
tility, and market access remains extremely limited for
some emerging markets”.
4 This group includes Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indone-
sia, Mexico, Republic of Korea, and Russian Federation.
5 It must be emphasized, however, that pledged bilateral
financing tends to be disbursed in smaller proportions than
the multilateral shares in rescue packages.
6 See, among others, IMF (1998a and b, 1999, 2000a and
b); Group of Seven (1998); UNCTAD (1998, Part One,
chap. IV); UN (1999); ECLAC (2000a); Miyazawa (1998);
Rubin (1999); Summers (1999); Camdessus (1998, 2000);
Fischer (1999); Akyüz and Cornford (1999); Eatwell and
Taylor (2000); Eichengreen (1999); Griffith-Jones (1998);
Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (1999); Ocampo (1999,
2000a); White (2000a, b); Wyplosz (1999).
7 A very strong statement in this regard was made by the
Governor of the People’s Bank of China: “The monopoly
by a handful of developed countries on the rule-making in
the international financial field must be changed” (Dai,
2000).
8 On the former, see Larraín et al. (1997); on the latter, Calvo
(1998).
9 For a more extensive analysis, see Ocampo (2000a).
Keynes’ concept of a “beauty contest” is thus much more
appropriate to analyse the volatility of expectations, as
Eatwell (1996) and Eatwell and Taylor (2000) have em-
phasized.
10 Group of Twenty-Four (1999b). See a more extensive dis-
cussion of this issue in IMF (1999, 2000a and b).
11 See, in this regard, the emphasis of the Group of Twenty-
Four (2000b) on the “imperative need for better coordi-
nation, coherence, and mutual reinforcement of macro-
economic and structural policies among the three major
economies in order to reduce the risks and uncertainties
in the global economy”, and the absence of this topic in
the parallel Communiqué of the IMF International Monetary
and Committee or in IMF (1999, 2000a, b and c) reports
on reforms of the international financial architecture.
12 See Group of Twenty-Four (1999b, 2000a). See also the
different points of view on this issue in Council on For-
eign Relations (1999).
13 This important distinction is made by Helleiner (1999)
and Eatwell and Taylor (2000). For a fuller discussion of
this issue and its relation to IMF access to adequate re-
sources, see Mohammed (1999).
14 See UN (1999); Council on Foreign Relations (1999);
Group of Twenty-Four (2000b); Meltzer et al. (2000);
Camdessus (2000).
15 See, in particular, Meltzer et al. (2000), and also Council
on Foreign Relations (1999).
16 Thus, Meltzer et al. (2000) would require borrowing coun-
tries, as conditions for access, fiscal soundness, minimum
prudential regulation, transparent data on debt and its struc-
ture, and freedom of operation for foreign financial insti-
tutions. The latter is absent, not only in current condition-
ality but in other proposals related to IMF financing.
17 It must be added that commercial bank lending did not
normalize in Latin America in the 1990s, despite the boom
in such financing to East and South-East Asia.
18 See a discussion along these lines in Ahluwalia (1999).
19 See the references quoted in footnote 6.
20 See a review of some of the controversies involved in IMF
(1999, 2000a and b), Boorman and Allen (2000) and
Fischer (1999).
21 See Gilbert et al. (1999), who, nonetheless, reject the idea
that market failures are an argument for development lend-
ing to middle-income countries. The idea suggested by
these authors that there is some kind of “natural monopoly”
in some types of development economics research is not a
sensible defence of the World Bank. The parallel idea that
global public goods should be provided is certainly valid,
but it justifies the existence of many types of international
institutions, not development banks per se.
22 The strongest argument in this regard is that of Meltzer
et al. (2000) but a weaker version can be found in Gilbert
et al. (1999), who argue, however, that the World Bank
should be allowed to lend to middle-income countries to
improve its portfolio.
23 Indeed, it is peculiar that Meltzer et al. (2000) estimate
the subsidies of development financing in the 1990s by
assuming that it is equivalent to only half of spreads in
capital markets.
24 Such financing could be tied to broader forms of anti-
cyclical management, on the basis of counterpart savings
in fiscal stabilization funds during the previous boom, or
repayment conditions that would require acceleration of
amortizations if fiscal revenues experienced a strong re-
covery during the subsequent boom.
25 Márquez (1999). Different groups would be supported by
unemployment insurance, emergency employment or
emergency labour-intensive public works programmes, in-
come-support schemes in conjunction with training, and
special targeted subsidies (such as some nutrition pro-
grammes, subsidies to households with school-age chil-
dren that are tied to school attendance, and various sup-
port programmes aimed at ensuring that households with
an unemployed head of household do not lose their home
during crises, etc.).
26 See Council on Foreign Relations (1999); Meltzer et al.
(2000); Collier and Gunning (1999); Feldstein (1998);
Helleiner (2000b); Rodrik (1999a).
27 See IMF (2000c) and Köhler (2000). The difficulties are
associated with the fact that, although IMF is expected to
focus on macroeconomic and financial issues, it should
also look at “their associated institutional and structural
aspects”. Such a broad definition led to the increasing
scope of conditionality over the past two decades.
28 See World Bank (1998a, chap. 2 and Appendix 2). See
also Gilbert et al. (1999), and Stiglitz (1999).
29 See a full discussion of these issues in Helleiner (1999).
30 The literature on national policies is extensive. See, among
recent contributions, ECLAC (2000b, chap. 8); World
Bank (1998b, chap. 3); Ffrench-Davis (1999); Helleiner
(1997); Ocampo (1999, 2000b).20 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 13
31 See an excellent recent treatment of this issue in Rodrik
and Velasco (1999).
32 See Agosin (1998); Agosin and Ffrench-Davis (2000); Le
Fort and Lehman (2000); Ocampo and Tovar (1998, 1999);
Villar and Rincón (2000).
33 Ocampo (2000a). Indeed, this instrument is similar to prac-
tices used by private agents, such as the sales fees im-
posed by mutual funds on investments held for a short
period in order to discourage short-term holdings. See JP
Morgan (1998: 23).
34 For a more extensive analysis of this subject, see UN
(1999); UNCTAD (1998, Part One, chap. IV); ECLAC
(1998, Part III); IMF (1999); Eichengreen (1999); Griffith-
Jones (1998); Grilli and Milesi-Ferreti (1995); Krugman
(1998a, b); Ocampo (2000a); Rodrik (1998).
35 See, in particular, Eatwell (1996); Eatwell and Taylor
(2000); Rodrik (1998); and, for Latin America, Ocampo
(1999).
36 Velasco (2000) provides a recent survey of the issues in-
volved.
37 The best conclusion on this subject, thus, is that reached
by IMF (2000a): “No single regime is appropriate for all
countries or in all circumstances”. See also ECLAC
(2000a, chap. 2), and, for a recent defence of intermedi-
ate regimes, Williamson (2000).
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